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The Problem of Religion in
Canadian Forces Postings
Liebmann vs the Minister of National Defence et al.
J.L. Granatstein

This paper was written in March 1998 as a brief to support the plaintiff in a case against the Minister and
Department of National Defence. I appeared as a witness and spoke to this brief, prepared using secondary sources
and documents provided by the Department of Justice, the government’s lawyers, to Lieutenant (Navy) Andrew
Liebmann’s counsel. Unfortunately, the judicial decision went against Liebmann.

I

n 1991 at the time of the Gulf War,
Canadian Navy Lieutenant Andrew
S. Liebmann sought and was offered
a posting as Executive Assistant
to Commodore Ken Summers, the
Commander of Canadian Forces
Middle East. The Government of
Canada had placed the naval, air,
and ground forces despatched to the
Gulf on active service, and for the first
time since the Korean War, Canada’s
armed forces were going to war.
Lieutenant (N) Liebmann,
however, was not to go with them.
Although the Gulf campaign was a
war, not peacekeeping, the regular
practice of the Canadian Forces of
ascertaining the religion and ethnic
origin of members being despatched
on peacekeeping appears to have
been followed in Liebmann’s case,
though perhaps mistakenly (as the
Department of National Defence
(DND) alleges). This practice of
screening had been in effect for
peacekeeping forces in the Middle
East since 1956 and in Cyprus since
1964 and possibly since Canada
first joined the United Nations
Truce Supervisory Organization
[UNTSO] on the Arab-Israeli borders
in February 1954. Being identified

as a Jew, Lieutenant Liebmann’s
posting, for which he had been
instructed to ready himself, was
cancelled for reasons that remain
in dispute. The question at issue,
however, is no longer what happened
to Liebmann and why. Instead,
the key question now is whether
the policy of screening Canadian
Forces personnel for peacekeeping
operations on the basis of religion
and ethnicity is a reasonable limit
in accordance with section 1 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms that can be demonstrably
justified in a democratic society.
I am a historian, not a lawyer,
and the historian’s first recourse is
to the published literature. While
there are some studies of First and
Second World War policies, other
than National Defence Headquarters
(NDHQ) Instruction Deputy Chief of
the Defence Staff (DCDS) documents
and Canadian Forces Administrative
Orders (CFAOs), regrettably there is
quite literally nothing in print that
touches on the Canadian Forces’ policy
of screening personnel despatched on
peacekeeping operations – let alone
into combat – to ensure that no one’s
religion, ethnicity, or gender might

cause upset in the host country or
possibly hinder the effectiveness of
the Canadian contingent. Nor do I
have access to recent DND documents
other than those disclosed for this
case by the Department of Justice.
For the purpose of this evidence,
however, I have read the DCDS and
CFAO documents and conducted
interviews with some individuals
who have relevant knowledge, and
I have done research on past aspects
of Canada’s military policy and
operations that bear on this case.

The Great War

T

he Canadian Forces in the 20th
century have long practiced a
discriminatory policy in enlistments.
During the Great War, there were
numerous examples of such policy,
though it was never formalized,
being motivated more by the
prejudices of those in command
or in the Cabinet at any one time.
The government worried about the
difficulties involved in recruiting
recent immigrants into the army,
fearing problems with language
and, more seriously, worried over
the enemy alien status of some. In
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1916, for example, a proposal to
raise a Polish battalion in Canada
was rejected, in part because of a
rumour that a Danish-Canadian in
the Canadian Expeditionary Force
had deserted to the Germans and
revealed information. Proposals
to raise a battalion of Japanese
Canadians received similarly short
shrift though, perhaps because Japan
was an ally and warships of the
Imperial Japanese Navy operated
patrols on the West Coast until 1917,
individuals were allowed to enlist
and 196 fought overseas. Chinese
Canadians also enlisted in small
numbers. The British Columbia
provincial government was markedly
unenthusiastic about the enlistment
of Japanese and Chinese Canadians,
primarily because it feared that
military service would entitle those
who served to the right to vote.
Indeed, in the 1917 federal election,
soldiers overseas, whatever their
ethnicity, did cast ballots. This cut
no ice in provincial politics, however,
and Japanese and Chinese Canadian
veterans did not get the British
Columbia franchise.
The Minister of Militia and
Defence also expressed concern that
native Canadians might not receive
“the privileges of civilized warfare”
in the front lines or if taken prisoner;
his Chief of the General Staff feared,
on the other hand, that Indians
could not withstand the rigours
of trench warfare and might fight
among themselves. And when the
government, increasingly desperate
for men, tried to encourage black
enlistments, General Gwatkin, the
Chief of the General Staff objected in
April 1916: “The civilized negroe [sic]
is vain and imitative...the average
white man will not associate with him
on terms of equality.” The latter part
of that comment was likely true. In
the end a construction unit of AfricanCanadians was raised and sent to
France, while many individuals
served in infantry battalions.
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The Canadian government also
connived at the recruitment of United
States citizens before American entry
to the war in April 1917, though
some in Ottawa worried about
such activities, and not only for fear
of diplomatic repercussions. The
Governor-General, the elderly Duke
of Connaught, for example, was
concerned in 1916 that “experience
has so far shown that American
citizens do not always make the best
of soldiers.” Whatever could have
created that fear, other than sheer antiAmericanism, was unimaginable.
During the Great War, some
thousands of nursing sisters aside,
women were not recruited for service
in the Canadian Expeditionary
Force. This has provoked the ire
of a few present day Canadian
feminist historians. In the widely
used university text, History of the
Canadian Peoples by Margaret Conrad
et al., such “exclusionary” policies
were denounced for increasing the
reinforcement shortages at the front.
“Despite the eagerness of some
women to go overseas,” the authors
state without offering any evidence,
“they were unwelcome on the front
lines.” That women were unwelcome
as combatants is clearly so; what the
textbook authors fail to consider are
the societal mores of the Great War
era and the simple fact that none
of the combatants on either side
used women soldiers. The ongoing
difficulties the Canadian Forces have
in integrating women into combat
units today suggest that the gender
problem, while insoluble in the 19141918 war, continues.

The Second World War

T

he Canadian government
followed roughly similar
recruiting policies in the Second
World War. Once again, women
were not combatants, though in this
war, the army, navy and air force
recruited women – in all, 50,000
served – for a variety of behind-the-

lines roles designed to release men
for front-line service. There was no
overt discrimination against AfricanCanadians – the idea of a black
construction battalion was no longer
acceptable to the Canadian public,
and blacks volunteered or were
conscripted as were other Canadians.
Once again, native Canadians were
encouraged to volunteer and large
numbers did so. However, there was
substantial resistance by Canadian
Indians to the conscription for
home defence provisions of the
National Resources Mobilization
Act 1940. Band leaders argued that
Indians constituted nations within
the Canadian nation and thus were
not subject to compulsory military
service. The resulting story is
complex, but, Michael Stevenson, the
one student of the subject, has noted
that compulsion was enforced with
“policies of apathy and indifference”
in the face of a Native “resistance
campaign.” The results of the callup of aboriginal Canadians were
insignificant at best.
Overt discrimination was the
policy faced by Chinese and Japanese
Canadians. Although Canada
actively encouraged enlistment from
virtually every other group, barriers
were placed in the way of Asians.
In British Columbia, there had
been longstanding and substantial
prejudices against Japanese
Canadians especially and secondarily
against Chinese Canadians. In 1940,
B.C.’s Attorney-General urged the
federal government not to call up
Japanese Canadians for military
service: “if these men are called upon
to perform the duties of citizens
and bear arms for Canada, it will be
impossible to resist the argument that
they are entitled to the franchise.”
Those who had served overseas
during the Great War had won the
right to vote, and this concerned the
British Columbia government. The
federal government concurred and,
for good measure, it also exempted
Japanese and Chinese Canadians
69
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from military training under the
National Resources Mobilization
Act. Prime Minister Mackenzie King
explained the decision on the grounds
that “the danger of the whole Oriental
problem” made it essential to act
on the wishes and judgment of the
provincial government. After protests
from within the federal government,
however, Ottawa created a Special
Committee on Orientals to report,
among other things, on the
question of military training. The
Committee report (2 December 1940)
recommended “most reluctantly and
not unanimously” that “Canadians
of Japanese race should not be given
military training.” Chinese Canadians
too, the Committee recommended,
should not be called upon for
military service. On 9 January 1941,
the Prime Minister accepted the
Committee recommendations:
henceforth, Japanese and Chinese
Canadians would not be accepted for
military service. This decision was
enthusiastically received by white
British Columbians. In fact, a few
Asians were enlisted. Some joined up
before the ban was put in place, and
a Nisei was accepted into the Army’s
Forestry Corps in July 1941, two more
joined the army later in the year, and
so did a Chinese Canadian.
Curiously, after 7 December 1941
and the Canadian declaration of war
against Japan, an interdepartmental
committee in Ottawa recommended
the enlistment of Asian Canadians –
to avoid the sense of racial
discrimination among Japanese
and Chinese Canadians and, more
important, to prevent envy among
white Canadians at their compatriots’
relief from military obligations.
This recommendation was turned
down by a Cabinet committee. The
army appeared to concur, the Chief
of the General Staff noting that
“While Canadian born persons of
Japanese origin may appear to be
good Canadian citizens, they do,
however, bear the appearance and
characteristics of another race, which
70 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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immediately sets them apart from
the average Canadian.” When it was
urged that those Japanese Canadians
already enlisted be released from the
service, the Cabinet War Committee
agreed but suggested that the Army
discharge them on “other than racial
grounds.” There is no evidence
of such dismissals, but further
enlistment was forbidden. A few
Chinese Canadians did manage to
enlist before, in 1944, Ottawa declared
Chinese Canadians subject to callup under the National Resources
Mobilization Act. By January 1945,
after requests had been received
from Britain and Australia for
Japanese interpreters, translators and
specialists, the Canadian government
allowed the enlistment of a small
number of Japanese Canadians. It
apparently mattered not at all that the
United States Army had successfully
raised a regiment of Japanese
Americans for combat service in
the European theatre of operations,
service that was performed with
high distinction. In all, 134 Japanese
Canadians served during the war,
a tribute to their loyalty to Canada
despite the discrimination to which
they had been subjected. There are
no accurate figures for Chinese
Canadian enlistment.
There is another point that
deserves to be made. In the Second
World War, the Canadian Forces
enlisted 16,720 Jews. Substantial
anti-Semitism existed in Canada, and
early in the war, at least, this was
particularly so in the Royal Canadian
Navy. Edwin Goodman records in his
memoirs that when he tried to enlist
in the Navy, he was told, “Forget this
program…I doubt that anyone who
is Jewish will be an officer in this
man’s navy.” As Goodman noted,
“The navy was the one branch of
the service that had a reputation for
bigotry, but that later disappeared
with the growing need for recruits.”
Others have written similarly.
Almost all of those Jews who
served overseas fought in Europe

against Germany. I raise this because
of Nazi policies toward Jews. While it
is doubtful that Canadian authorities
knew many details of the Holocaust
until very late in the war, no one
doubted Nazi hatred of Jews, but this
neither prevented nor inhibited the
Canadian government from putting
Canadian Jews into action against
Germany. All that was done to protect
Jewish servicemen against Nazi
vengeance was to stamp identity discs
with “OD” (Other Denomination)
rather than Hebrew or Jewish. Jewish
veterans, including former Minister
of National Defence Barney Danson,
a Queen’s Own Rifles officer in
Normandy, have told me that they
discussed their fate if captured by
the Wehrmacht or the SS – few seem
to have expected much mercy. As it
turned out, however, the Germans
abided by the Geneva Convention
and did not treat Jewish Prisoners of
War (there were 84 Canadian Jewish
POWs) more harshly than others;
when Canada sent them into action,
however, none in authority knew that
this would be the case.
Still, the government and armed
forces had no other option. It was
neither politically nor morally
possible to exclude Canadian Jews
from combat on the grounds that the
Nazis might treat them differently
than other POWs. All the Jews in
the armed forces were volunteers
(except for those conscripted under
the National Resources Mobilization
Act), and they asked nothing from
their government that other Canadian
servicemen did not. During the war,
in other words, Canadian Jews
served, fought, and risked death
exactly as all Canadian soldiers,
sailors, and airmen did. This was as
it should have been.

Peacekeeping

T

he first Canadian peacekeepers
went abroad in 1950 to serve with
the United Nations Military Observer
Group India-Pakistan. This sending
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of a handful of officers was followed,
as noted above, by the despatch
of an additional small number of
observers to UNTSO along the
borders between Israel and its Arab
neighbours in 1954. In the same year,
Canada sent a substantial number of
officers and enlisted men to Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia to serve on the
International Control Commissions,
the nation’s first non-United Nations
peacekeeping effort. Canada’s first
major deployment in the service of
United Nations peacekeeping came
on the heels of the Suez Crisis of 1956.
Secretary of State for External Affairs
Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace
Prize for his invention of what might
be called interpository peacekeeping
as a way of separating the attacking
British-French-Israeli forces from
the Egyptians. The United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) was the
result, and Canada despatched a
contingent of more than a thousand
men.
There is an allusion in the
transcript of evidence, taken for
this case in 1996, of Colonel J.M.
Snell that the religion of servicemen
being considered for UNEF service
might have been a factor in postings
as early as 1957. I believe this to be
very likely and can contribute one
additional piece of data to this story.
In 1960-1961, I was in my fourth
year at the Royal Military College
of Canada, my intention at that time
being to serve on graduation as a
regular Army officer. As part of my
course in honours history, I was
writing an undergraduate thesis
on Canadian peacekeeping, and I
secured access to some otherwise
closed records at NDHQ, Ottawa,
including nominal rolls of those
personnel sent to UNEF between 1957
and 1960. I had no way of ascertaining
the religion of Canadian personnel so
I simply checked the rolls, looking for
obvious Jewish names (a method also
mentioned in the Snell’s evidence).
I recognized that this was a highly
imperfect device, but I was interested
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss4/8
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to see if there was a practical religious
test being applied, not least because
I wondered how my being Jewish in
origin could affect my own military
career. I found no such names and
reported this in my thesis. 1 How
significant this was, frankly, was
unclear primarily because I had no
idea how many Jews were then in the
Canadian Forces. My own military
career ended in 1966 and, as I never
had the opportunity to serve on a
Middle East peacekeeping mission,
my nominal religion in no way
affected my service.
As for post-UNEF Middle
East peacekeeping, whatever the
administrative orders, anything
other than anecdotal evidence is very
limited. I asked Barney Danson and
Lieutenant-General (retired) Charles
Belzile, a former commander of the
Army, if they were aware of Jewish
or other servicemen being barred
from peacekeeping in the Middle
East Danson recalled one case that
occurred during his time as Minister
(1976-1979) when a Jewish soldier
was dropped from a peacekeeping
mission. There was a fuss and Danson,
who believed this was improper, had
the case re-examined. In the end, he
said, the soldier was given the choice
of proceeding and, after weighing all
circumstances, decided to go. This
seems a good solution.
Even before a written policy
was formulated at NDHQ, Belzile
recalled that when there were cases of
potential difficulty on peacekeeping
operations arising out of religion
or ethnicity, the usual practice
in his time as Army commander
was to unofficially discourage the
serviceman. He recalled the case of
a Turkish-Canadian officer whose
suitability for a posting to Cyprus was
questioned. What would the Greek
Cypriots say? What if the officer had
relatives in Turkey, a NATO ally
but scarcely a democracy, and was
subjected to pressure as a result?
Belzile indicated that there were
discussions, including some with

the officer in question, presumably
in an effort to dissuade the officer
from accepting the posting. In the
end, the officer was sent to Cyprus
but his employment in the field
was restricted. For example, he was
not permitted to lead patrols into
Greek Cypriot territory. This seems
a perfectly sensible compromise, one
that minimized any possible harm
to the effectiveness of the Canadian
force and one that would not hurt
the career of the officer in question
as might have occurred if he had
been forbidden an overseas posting.
Given Canada’s 30 years in Cyprus
and the centrality of peacekeeping to
the Canadian Forces for much of the
period from 1964 to 1994 that Canada
had troops there, it is reasonable
to believe that an officer barred
from service in Cyprus might have
suffered in his career.2
A Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff Instruction (DCDS 9/83)
formalized the Canadian Forces
policy in 1983. While piously stating
that there would be no posting
restrictions “for purely ethnic, racial
or religious reasons,” the policy went
on to suggest that “considerations of
safety and neutrality…might exist or
arise that could impede the effective
functioning” of a peacekeeping force
or the safety of an individual or other
members of the force. To obviate
this, the policy directed that “the
personnel records of all CF members
nominated for peacekeeping duties
will be screened” prior to posting.
“If it appears that ethnic, racial
or religious considerations could
cause significant difficulties in the
peacekeeping theatre concerned,
individuals may be precluded from
selection for such duties.” The
policy also allowed for the recall of
personnel if their race, religion or
ethnicity is found to cause problems
in theatre. The Canadian Forces
policy after this instruction came into
force was, therefore, discriminatory
despite the use of the weasel words
“may be precluded.” Nonetheless,
71
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Robert Fowler, in March 1989 the
Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)
at NDHQ, declared it “appropriate”
that this policy “be tightened up
somewhat,” adding that the reason
for this was “to protect the rights
and safety of members, and not to
ignore their rights.” What Fowler
could have meant by this tightening
up of a discriminatory practice as a
method of protecting the rights of
Canadian Forces personnel is unclear
to me. Nonetheless the process
urged by Fowler obviously resulted
in the issuance of Canadian Forces
Administrative Order 20-53, a further
codification of the Canadian Forces’
discriminatory practices.
It seems clear that this policy
has been applied almost exclusively
in the Middle East. Belzile told me
in an interview that he had visited a
battalion of the Royal 22e Régiment
in Haiti in 1997 in his capacity as
Colonel Commandant. The Canadian
force there included an intelligence
section of Haitian-Canadians, all
either born in Haiti or in Canada of
Haitian parents. These men spoke
the Haitian patois and understood
the local society, a clear advantage
to the Canadian force. On the other
hand, given the political, economic,
and class divisions in Haitian society,
they might have been exposed to
pressures from various factions.
NDHQ apparently did not consider
the possibility of pressure being
exerted on service personnel of
Haitian origin or ethnicity in such
a case to be serious enough to block
their inclusion in the Canadian
contingent. That a different policy
was and is applied in the Middle
East to Jewish and Muslim service
personnel is repugnant.
It is also worth noting that for
the last decade and a half, female
Canadian Forces personnel have been
posted overseas in an ever-increasing
variety of roles, including service
in infantry units on peace support
operations. There were also women
sailors on board Canadian Navy
72 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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vessels during the Gulf War, a policy
that might have been construed to
be potentially as offensive to strict
Muslim Arab allies as the presence
of a Canadian Jewish officer.

American, British
and UN Practices

I

ndeed, the United States forces, the
major provider of troops for the Gulf
War, based large numbers of women
in Saudi Arabia. It is abundantly clear
that the Saudi authorities raised no
more objection to US women than
they did to American Jewish service
personnel serving on their soil and
in their waters. Presumably, and
properly, American women service
personnel, just like Jewish personnel,
were briefed on how to – and how
not to – behave to minimize Saudi
concerns. Significantly, the United
States military followed its policies
which are non-discriminatory.
Indeed, the American practice
of posting service members
overseas, detailed in Department of
Defense Directive 1315.7 – Military
Personnel Assignments, is very
clear: “Assignment shall be made
for all service members without
regard to their color, race, religious
preference (except chaplains), ethnic
background, national origin, age, or
gender (except where prohibited by
statute and limitation of facilities)
consistent with requirements for
physical capabilities.” Moreover, the
Directive lays down a procedure to
be followed if a foreign government
refuses to accept US personnel. A
“Summary of Selected Nations’
Policy on Employment Restrictions
Peacekeeping Forces,” prepared in
NDHQ in March 1989 did, however,
note that “unofficially, in practice”
the US forces selectively fill positions
in UNTSO “to ensure that the
individual by reason of race, age,
religion, etc, would not jeopardize the
mission or cause undue hardship or
danger to the individual or others.”
How much weight should be put on

information – gossip? – gathered to
give NDHQ the information it so
clearly sought is doubtful.
For their part, the British have
no written policy that would restrict
serving officers and other ranks by
virtue of ethnicity, gender, or religion.
Women can be barred from certain
posts to maintain a unit’s combat
effectiveness, however, and the War
Office exercises some caution – on a
case by case basis – in considering
whether to post women abroad
“where their presence may cause
offence to the host government…”
While “All personnel in the British
Armed Forces are treated as equal,”
there might be cases that would
require individual consideration,
as in covert operations “where a
person’s ethnic origin may prevent
them from being selected.” The
British therefore follow a practice that
seems a pragmatic mix of principle
and efficiency. There is no blanket
prohibition, but on a case by case
basis, judgments can be made on
postings.
It is worth noting that American
and British policies are not
hypothetical. Both the United States
and Britain have contributed and
continue to contribute to peacekeeping
operations. At 31 December 1997, the
British had 401 soldiers in Cyprus, 11
on the Iraq-Kuwait border, 60 on the
International Police Task Force, and
7 on the UN Mission in Georgia for
a total of 479. The United States had
644 troops engaged in peacekeeping,
with officers and other ranks serving
on the Israel-Arab borders, on the
Iraq-Kuwait border, in the Western
Sahara, in Eastern Slavonia, on the
International Police Task Force, in
Macedonia, Georgia, and Haiti. At
this same time, Canada deployed 254
peacekeepers on eight missions.
That the US and UK seem able
to meet their extensive peacekeeping
requirements without overtly
discriminatory regulations is worth
noting. That Britain is the historic link
to the Canadian military tradition and
5
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the United States today is our closest
military partner is also noteworthy. I
can discern no reason why Canadian
military regulations need be more
discriminatory than those of our
closest friends and allies.
Why they need be more
discriminatory than the policies
of the United Nations itself again
is unknown. When the Canadian
Permanent Mission to the UN
inquired in February 1989 of the
“responsible UN official” what United
Nations policy on the employment of
personnel on peacekeeping was, the
official simply passed the buck back
to the contributing national military
forces. The UN Force commander
could determine the “assets and
liabilities of each individual,” a
phrase that could (and most likely
does) refer to military efficiency
rather than religion or gender. The
UN official did indicate that women
might be a potential problem in
some countries and said that their
employment has been limited “in
order to avoid complications in
the field.” The UN, however, also
informed the Canadian delegation
in New York that “With regard to
religion, ‘religion is invisible’ but that
females are not.”
As documents provided by
the Department of Justice indicate
clearly, DND found this answer
unsatisfactory. Robert Fowler
observed in March 1989 that “it will
not be possible to base our policy on
the United Nations’ approach.” The
Department then began a canvass of
the policies followed by other nations
in screening personnel for Middle
East peacekeeping. All (Norway,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland,
Australia, New Zealand, and Poland)
had no policy on religion because
of the tiny numbers of Jews or
Muslims in their populations or
armed forces. Australia classified
peacekeeping as active service and
automatically barred women. New
Zealand apparently had not drawn
its peacekeepers from military
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss4/8
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specialties in which women personnel
in its armed forces were employed.
Thus Canada was on its own in
drafting its tightened policy, blazing
a trail where none but Canada had
gone before. The policy codified in
Canadian Forces Administrative
Order 20-53 represented DND’s
attempt to do so, and the only
concession to the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms was that, as the
drafting progressed, the initial
phrasing – the “cultural, religious
and racial sensitivities” of the host
nation – was altered to the slightly
less blatant “cultural, religious, and
other sensitivities.” Perhaps DND
ought to have been just as concerned
by the pandering to the cultural and
religious sensitivities of host nations.

Conclusion

H

ow does all this evidence apply
to this case? In the first place,
as has been noted above, Canadian
policy has been discriminatory
in this century. Blacks, Native
Canadians, Japanese Canadians, and
Chinese Canadians suffered overt
discrimination in being prevented
or discouraged from service during
one or both of the First and Second
World Wars. There is evidence that
ethnicity has been a concern to the
Canadian Forces, not least in Cyprus,
as well as evidence that Jewish
(and presumably Muslim) service
personnel were prevented from
serving with peacekeeping missions
in the Middle East both before and
after the enactment of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The
Canadian nation and the Canadian
Forces that serve it are increasingly
multicultural in their makeup, and
overt discrimination against those
who seek to serve their country,
wherever they come from, whatever
their religion and ethnicity, must not
be practiced or tolerated. There is, to
be sure, a balance to be found between
the rights of individual Canadian
Forces personnel and the operational

effectiveness of the peace support
force in which they may serve, but
it seems to me that individual rights
and freedoms must almost always
take precedence. Intelligently drafted
regulations, sensibly and sensitively
interpreted to protect the rights of
individuals and assist the Canadian
Forces to accomplish their mission,
are needed, but blanket prohibitions
are not the way to proceed.
Consider one hypothetical
situation. Say Canada was called on
to send a battalion of infantry to do
peacekeeping in Northern Ireland.
In a bitterly sectarian conflict where
Protestants and Roman Catholics
historically have been at each others’
throats, which infantry unit could
Canada send? The francophone
Royal 22e Régiment, its members
overwhelmingly Roman Catholic,
might possibly be unacceptable to
Ulster Unionists; the anglophone
Royal Canadian Regiment, its
personnel substantially Protestant
with some presumably also of
Irish heritage, might be equally
unacceptable to Sinn Féin. Other than
raising a Jewish or Muslim regiment,
how could Canada participate in
such a peacekeeping operation? I
suggest that it goes without saying
that Canada would send the R22eR
or the RCR without a moment’s
hesitation, the very idea that there
would be any problem of impartiality
being dismissed at once by NDHQ.
So it should be. But how then can the
Canadian Forces suggest or imply
that a Canadian Jew or Muslim might
be an impediment to an operational
mission in the Middle East?
The right to bear arms is a
cherished tenet of citizenship, and
it violates my sense of what Canada
has become and is today to bar
service personnel from honourable
service solely because of their faith or
ethnicity. After reading the relevant
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
Instructions and Canadian Forces
Administrative Orders, the trial
record, the reasons for order, the
73
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transcript of evidence of Colonel
Snell, and the documents provided
by the Department of Justice, I am
forced to conclude that the Canadian
Forces practices discrimination on
the basis of religion and ethnicity.
Canadian military personnel are
Canadians, whatever their origins or
faith, and they deserve to be treated
as loyal servants of their nation. The
present policy categorizes soldiers by
race and religion and is profoundly
repugnant.

Notes
In his Pearson’s Peacekeepers, Canada and
the United Nations Emergency Force, 195667 (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2009), p.132, Michael

had no relatives in Cyprus and no enosis
sympathies. Col. Petrolekas also noted
that he later served in Former Yugoslavia
where he was a co-religionist of the Serbs
and that this had some benefits to the
mission: “there is a wide gap between
using…a religious/ethnic foundation
on Canada’s behalf to being somehow
thought of as co-opted.”Email from Col.
Petrolekas, 8 February 2010. It is possible
that General Belzile may have recalled the
Petrolekas case and confused the officer’s
ethnic origin. The time frame is roughly
coincidental in both accounts.

J.L. Granatstein is co-author (with Dean
F. Oliver) of The Oxford Companion to
Canadian Military History (2010).
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Carroll notes that in UNEF’s “early days”
a Jewish Canadian soldier was recalled
from UNEF duty for fear of being “a
source of embarrassment to the United
Nations.”
A dozen years after writing this deposition,
I learned of another case involving a
young Canadian-born officer of Greek
origin who was posted to Cyprus with
his battalion and then was summoned to
see the Canadian contingent commander.
The colonel “insisted that I not serve
on the line lest I become a pretext for a
problem.” The junior officer protested
that he had already met his Greek and
Turk counterparts who did not think his
origins were an issue, but the colonel
insisted “and so I had to be pulled off the
line to work a logistic role or be pulled
out of the country…I was extraordinarily
angry at the time…” The young officer,
now Colonel George Petrolekas, noted
that he spoke fluent Greek and “the value
that we lose by projecting a potential issue
that doesn’t exist is that people like me
could have been of greater help if used
properly.” His security screening, he
said, should have revealed that his family

Anti-submarine trawlers built at St. Lawrence yards under Admiralty contract, and assigned to the Royal Canadian Navy for
operations on the East Coast in view of the German U-boat operations in North American waters that began in the spring of 1918.
The photograph is probably from the late spring of 1918 when the newly completed trawlers fitted out at Quebec City or Montreal.
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